Though the book is the work of many contributors, mainly Cambridge based, the chapters have been carefully assembled to produce a unified work. The first section deals with the complex array of cellular mechanisms involved in damage to brain and spinal cord (collectively referred to as the central nervous system, CNS). In general, these mechanisms are peculiar to the CNS, not found in other tissues of the body. They include the regulation of cell death, the effects of cutting axons, and demyelination. Metabolic forms of damage, the spread of infection and inflammation, and degenerative diseases also take forms unique to CNS tissue.
From the title one might expect a distillation from popular magazines devoted to male fitness and narcissism. In fact the book emanates from the International Society for the Study of the Aging Male. I received it with curiosity mixed with guilt-the former because I wondered what a specific textbook could offer over and above established textbooks of medicine; the latter the guilt of one who has lapsed. Anticipation was quickly overtaken by the controlled panic of clinical self-doubt: could the seemingly all-pervasive presence of androgenic matters be pointing to a major black hole in a 'mature' clinical repertoire? Though I can claim my fair share of clinical coups in older men complaining vaguely of being tired all the time-coeliac disease, myasthenia gravis, and a meningioma, to name just a few-never have I diagnosed an 'andropause'. Discreet questioning of unequivocally able colleagues suggests I am not alone.
Androgens clearly have interesting roles, but the multiple accounts of androgenic pathophysiology scattered throughout this book are cumulatively unconvincing as well as repetitive. To judge from these accounts, a person answering a multiple-choice question on the symptoms of androgen deficiency would best go for the option 'all of the above'. There seems to be no consensus on reference values for adrenal androgens. The question posed, 'Does visceral adiposity induce low levels of testosterone, or do low levels of testosterone induce visceral adiposity?' simply led me to wonder idly about the role of lager and other male secular comforts. As to be expected in a multiauthor book, some of the contributors provide good well-rounded accounts-for example, the substantial chapters on the genitourinary system and the concise and well written account of hair disorders. This is not, however, a comprehensive text, and matters such as Parkinson's disease, accidents, suicide, stroke, amputation and rehabilitation are notably absent, contrary to the medical experience of ageing men. The final chapter, on hormone treatments and preventive strategies, is overwhelmingly and unacceptably dominated by androgens. 69 references largely relate to androgens, yet a discussion of melatonin, which suggests that 'Insomnia observed in some elderly people can be partially restored by administering Melatonin', is based on trials that are not referenced. The prescribing advice does not feel robustfor UK readers, not NICE at all.
A textbook addressing a defined field such as this should provide a balanced account and the editors should condense the material, where possible, to provide a coherent narrative. I cannot recommend this work, but for a second opinion I showed it to two third-year medical students. After dipping into and out of it over several lazy summer days they were more positive, suggesting that they would use it if it were in their library; so it may have a place. I am sure androgens themselves have a place in a text on this subject, but the promised future editions should corral them into a single coherent account and widen the horizons. There can be few better illustrations of why the term 'evidence-based medicine' is misleading than the title of Kenneth W Goodman's (no relation) thought-provoking book. The question has been asked many times, but what other sort of medicine is there? Medicine that is intentionally divorced from evidence is unworthy even of ethical consideration. It is the subtitle of the book that is the author's real subject-fallibility and responsibility in clinical science-though even that is wrongly phrased. Had the title been 'The Ethics of Uncertainty in Clinical Medicine', I would have started reading with less prejudice.
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) should have been called epidemiology-based medicine. Its basic flaw is an overreliance on meta-analysis, which, as many but especially Bruce Charlton (whose papers, like mine on this subject, go uncited in Goodman's work) have pointed out, is an insecure basis for treating individuals. It also proposes 'levels of evidence' upon medicine without due allowance for the fact that different questions in different circumstances demand different sorts of evidence. Had its advocates used the term epidemiology-based medicine, this approach might have made less impact but would have generated less antipathy. As Kenneth Goodman realizes (p. 58), the arguments are not whether we should use evidence but what sort of evidence we should use.
Goodman's message is that the evidence-based medicine movement has the welfare of patients at heart, that it is our duty to pay attention to the movement (though not slavishly), and that we must also strive to reduce uncertainty in medical practice. In the 140 pages of text he also canters through the ethics of using secondary evidence in databases, the difficulties of public health policy, and some reflections on informed consent. Some of his ideas are challenging, and many will have readers nodding agreement; but it is hard not to think that he is chasing a platitude. And ultimately that platitude comes up against a truism, which he recognizes (p. 139)-there is no general statement or rule that governs the reliability or uncertainty of medical evidence, and no algorithm to tell us what we should do when we don't know what to do. Medicine is never going to be easy; moreover, it may never get any easier.
What really disappoints me is his treatment of metaevidence (p. 44 et seq.). He picks it up between his teeth but then sets it down gently. He describes the process of systematic review as 'scientific', but it is not (although perhaps he is not rigorous in his definition of science since management and marketing is earlier referred to as one of the 'sciences' that first embraced meta-analysis). I would have liked to see the views of Bruce Charlton and Jonathan Rees considered here. Why doesn't he keep hold of the notion that there is 'a lot wrong with the gold-standard randomised controlled trial' and run with that idea? He quotes John Bailar (p. 59) granting metaanalysis 'a potentially useful role in carefully selected situations', but doesn't quote Bailar (as I have) saying that the problems of meta-analysis are so deep that he worries should their results be too readily applied clinically. Nor does he cite Bailar's preference for the oldfashioned review by the knowledgeable expert explaining and defending judgments. Goodman consistently discards narrative reviews as biased: 'the inadequacies of narrative reviews left us no choice but to develop these epistemic engines' (p. 29); 'narratives are biased . . . because the nature of the review was such that reviewers could not find a . . . neutral vantage point ' (p. 44) .
Goodman is good on the debate about science versus art in medicine. He cleverly argues that the art is really tacit experiential knowledge, which is what underlies 'clinical judgment'. He is also realistic about the difficulties of incorporating patient preferences into treatment plans (p. 135): 'Sometimes they just do not make any sense [and become] a silly waste of public money'. And, a couple of pages further on, while stressing the ethical imperative that lies with individual clinicians, 'We should be forgiven the weariness that accompanies the need to sort out individual duties in an environment in which society has dropped the ball'.
The book discusses important issues, but under the wrong title and with a hollow centre. It is still worth reading, but a second, retitled, expanded edition ought to be better. I can thank Goodman at least for not describing evidence-based medicine as a 'new paradigm'.
